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Abstract 
We analyse if the Brazilian Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE-type system) reduces the debt 
tax bias. Specifically, we study if the continuous treatment effect of interest on equity negatively 
affects the level of financial leverage. We find that the tax policy implemented is similar to the 
deductible cash dividends and not to an ACE. The empirical implication is that the interest on 
equity treatment increases the debt tax bias, producing a rebound effect to what is expected for 
this policy on the risk-taking behaviour and corporate capital structure. This rebound effect is 
homogeneous in firms with different financial constraints status. There are evidences that 
shareholders influence the cash distribution policy, adjusting the later to their own tax preferences. 
Keywords: capital structure; debt bias; dividend; dose-response function; financial constraints; 
taxation. 
JEL classification: G32, G35, H20, H25 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The tax deductibility of interest expenses has been considered to be an historical accident 
(Schoenmaker & Goodhart, 2010), with no legal or economic reasons for its existence as policy 
(Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, 2010; Warren Jr., 1974). The tax discrimination between debt and 
equity has been identified as a policy leading to harmful effects on the legal distinction between 
the two types of financing (Warren Jr., 1974), on how the firms choose their financing sources 
and on how much risk they bear (Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, 2010). To De Mooij (2011), the 
deductibility of debt has created a debt tax bias favouring the excessive use of leverage, which 
has been associated with a higher vulnerability of firms in the presence of credit crunches. When 
there is rationing in the supply of credit or equity, a tax distortion may favour firms with better 
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access to the credit market (Meza & Webb, 1987). This discrimination may also be associated 
with avoidances strategies (tax minimization) by debt-shifting within the business group, by tax 
arbitrage between affiliates in countries with different marginal tax rates, or by using hybrid 
instruments (De Mooij & Devereux, 2010; Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, 2010). In the same line, 
the debt tax shield can lead to a distortion on the efficient investment allocation, favouring 
projects that otherwise would not be followed without this benefit (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & 
Nicodème, 2012). 
The theoretical and empirical discussion regarding policies to correct or eliminate the debt 
tax bias is not new. However, recent evidence that the debt-equity tax distortion amplified the 
adverse effects of the recent financial crisis on firms (De Mooij, Keen & Orihara, 2013; 
Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, 2010; IMF, 2009; Shackelford, Shaviro & Slemrod, 2010; Shaviro, 
2012) and also pervert the corporate policies on the capital and income flows due to the increasing 
business internationalization (De Mooij & Devereux, 2010), have brought back this subject to 
light. 
There are several policy options to reduce the debt tax bias by changing the corporate tax 
system. There are the more conventional ones, such as, reducing the corporate tax rate in order to 
decrease the debt tax shield, implementing thin capitalization rules, or limiting the deductibility 
of the interest expenses (Fatica, Hemmelgarn & Nicodème, 2012). However, such measures 
increase the complexity of the tax system and their effectiveness is questionable (De Mooij & 
Devereux, 2010). A more extreme measure would be to implement a system of Allowance for 
Corporate Equity (ACE). 
Although several initiatives to address the debt bias have taken place on developed 
European countries, the emerging economies could potentially benefit more from these initiatives, 
since they face higher levels of leverage and less resilient financial systems  (FSB Financial 
Stability Board, 2015). In this context, Brazil is known as being the only emerging country with 
experience implementing an ACE-type system. Meanwhile, given the specificities of the 
Brazilian system, one may question its effectiveness as a tool to reduce the debt tax bias. Thus, 
the main goal of this research is to empirical verify the real effects of this tax policy on the debt 
tax bias. The empirical strategies followed aim at surpassing the methodological limitations of 
previous studies while considering: the policy implementation as a continuous treatment; 
confounding factors; auto-selection bias and treatment endogeneity. 
The results suggest that the specificities of the Brazilian system mischaracterize the 
system as an ACE-type, making it just a deductible tax system of cash distribution to shareholders. 
Indeed, the tests performed show that the Brazilian ACE-type system produces the opposite effect 
to the one expected from this type of system, that is, increases the debt tax bias (rebound effect) 
instead of reducing it. Additional tests also show that this rebound effect is not idiosyncratic to 
the financial constraint level of the firm. 
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The present study contributes to the existing literature on tax policy, on capital structure 
and on cash distribution policies. At the tax level it contributes to a better understanding on how 
different ACE systems affect the effectiveness on reducing the debt tax bias, subject to 
institutional factors specific of emerging economies. Mainly, it clarifies that the Brazilian tax 
system cannot be considered an ACE-type system experiment. To the literature on capital 
structure and cash distribution, it allows for a better understanding on how the tax factor affects 
both policies simultaneously. This research also contributes to better understand how shareholders 
may influence the cash distribution policy, adjusting the later to their own tax preferences. The 
Brazilian case is the only one known that allows us to investigate the effect of dosage of the ACE 
policy. This study is the first to explore this opportunity and adequately address confounding 
factors. 
This paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we present the main characteristics of the 
ACE systems and the specificities of the Brazilian ACE-type system, and also develop our 
working hypotheses; in section 3, we outline the empirical strategy; in section 4, we report the 
results and proceed with the discussion; and, in section 5, we make the final remarks. 
 
2. ACE system and hypotheses development  
 
2.1 Brazilian ACE-Type System 
 
ACE is a variant of Allowance for Corporate Capital (ACC) first proposed by (Boadway 
& Bruce, 1984). The main idea behind ACC is to abolish the deductibility of the interest expenses 
and replace it by a notional risk-free return on the book value of the firm’s capital. The ACE-type 
system, first introduced by the Capital Taxes Committee of the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(Devereux & Freeman, 1984; IFS Capital Taxes Group, 1991) differs from the ACC by still 
allowing the deductibility of the interest expenses, while adding the tax deductibility against 
corporate profits of a notional risk-free rate on equity. Both the ACC and the ACE systems assume 
the notional return as being risk free, since the tax advantage from its deductibility is taken for 
granted (Bond & Devereux, 1995).  
The Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) has been considered as an alternative 
to ACE system. CBIT system eliminates the deductibility of the interest expenses, and thus 
eliminates the debt tax bias, it leads to negative collateral effects by increasing the firm’s cost of 
capital and by exacerbating the distortion on marginal investments. De Mooij & Devereux (2010) 
consider the ACE system preferable to the CBIT system because of the following four favourable 
properties: first and foremost, it allows for the neutrality between debt and equity; second, it 
neutralizes the tax effect on marginal investment decisions; third, it avoids the distortion on 
investment induced by differences between economic and tax depreciation; and fourth, it lowers 
the firm’s cost of capital.  
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 De Mooij & Devereux (2010) use a general equilibrium model to simulate the 
implementation of both the ACE and CBIT systems in the European Community. Given the need 
to adjust the statutory corporate tax in order to compensate for the reduction on tax revenue on 
the ACE system, there is an increase in the effective average tax rate (EATR). A higher EATR 
decreases the internal funds and intensifies the international profit shifting and discrete location, 
which affect corporate investment decisions. These collateral effects of the ACE system make the 
CBIT system more efficient and welfare improving, at the country level, and also in the presence 
of capital-market imperfections (Hubbard, 1998). Meanwhile, the ACE system becomes more 
efficient than the CBIT system when implemented in a jointly manner through all the European 
Community. In addition to the experiences that have been made regarding the ACE system,  this 
is also the preferred system by some of the proponents of fiscal policies to reduce the debt bias 
(IFS Capital Taxes Group, 1991; FSB Financial Stability Board, 2015). 
Simulation models evaluating individual fiscal reforms using variants of the ACE system 
in Switzerland  (Keuschnigg & Dietz, 2007) and Germany (Radulescu & Stimmelmayr, 2007) 
suggest a reduction on the cost of capital and an increase in the investment level. However, the 
results from real experiments implementing the ACE-type systems (e.g. in Austria, Belgium, 
Croatia and Italy) show no clear-cut evidence on the economic impact of these reforms (De Mooij 
& Devereux, 2010). This lack of evidence is mostly due to two factors: first, the implementation 
of the ACE system on these countries was part of a package of multiple reforms, making it hard 
to identify the impact of a specific reform; and second, the reforms did not include all the 
characteristics of the ACE system, thus being only an ACE-type system. The exception to both 
these factors was the implementation of the ACE system in Belgium, in 2006. 
Brazil is the only emerging economy with an ACE system. The country implemented in 
1996 a tax reform, Law 9.249/95 (Brasil, 1995), which has been classified as an ACE-type system 
(Klemm, 2007; IMF, 2009; De Mooij, 2012; ICC Commission on Taxation, 2012; Panier, 
González-Pérez & Villanueva, 2013). However, and although sharing common goals, the 
Brazilian system diverges in fundamental properties from the other implemented systems and 
from the original proposal by  IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991). 
The Brazilian ACE-type system is characterized by three distinctive elements.  First, it 
only allows for the tax deductibility of the notional interest, denominated as interest on equity 
(IOE), when this is paid out to the shareholders. The IOE is deducted when considering the 
corporate income tax (CIT). Brazilian CIT is 34% and includes an income tax rate of 25%, Law 
nº 9.249/1995 (Brasil, 1995), and a social contribution tax rate of 9%, Law nº 7.689-88 (Brasil, 
1988). To determine the IOE we have to consider the amount of equity (E) minus the revaluation 
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reserves (RR), both from the previous fiscal year, i.e. (Et-1 – RRt-1). The notional risk-free rate 
used is the Long-Term Interest Rate (LTIR) 2 in t-1. 
Second, the system includes eligibility criteria that limits the level of notional interest 
accepted as tax deductible. Eligible firms are those that cumulatively have in t-1 positive equity 
and also fulfil one of the following criteria: having positive earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT), or having positive retained earnings (RE). The IOE accepted for deductibility must not 
exceed 50% of the EBIT or 50% of the RE, the highest. 
Third, there is a tax rate of 15% on the interest on equity, which is retained by the paying 
firm. Additionally, the personal income tax rate on the interest on equity received varies in 
accordance to the nature of the beneficial shareholder. When the shareholder is a physical entity 
or the government, the retained tax rate of 15% is definitive. Institutional investors and pension 
funds are exempt from income tax, Law 9.532/1997 art. 28 and 33 (Brasil, 1997), and thus 
compensation is allowed. When the shareholders are firms, these are taxed through the real 
income system and may be compensated for the retained tax rate of 15%, but are subject to an 
income tax rate of 34% on the financial income from the interest on equity received (firms with 
an annual income lower than R$ 240.000 have a lower tax rate of 24%). Additionally, when the 
shareholders are firms, these must pay for social purposes 1.65% and 7.6% on the interest on 
equity received, corresponding to the contribution to the Programa de Integração Social (Social 
Integration Program) and Contribuição para Financiamento da Seguridade Social (Contribution 
to Social Security Financing), respectively. 
Overall, the tax savings3 for physical entities and government is 19% (34%-15%), to 
institutional investors and pension funds is 34% (34%-0%), e to legal entities it may be -9.25% 
(34%-15%-34%-9.25%) or 0.75% (34%-15%-24%-9.25%), depending on the income level of the 
firm. Besides, in the case where the shareholders are firms, the disincentive increases as one uses 
corporate control structures of pyramidal form, due to the double taxation (or more, depending of 
the control-enhancing mechanism level adopted). So, depending on the legal form of the 
shareholder, one may find significant differences in the tax incentives, and thus on the propensity 
to be willing to receive the interest on equity. Boulton, Braga-Alves & Shastri (2012) and 
Colombo & Terra (2014) find evidence on Brazilian firms that the legal form of the controlling 
shareholders affect not only the propensity to pay, but also the amount of interest on equity paid. 
The authors point out the positive effect on the IOE paid when institutional investors, with a 
minimum stake in the firm of 5% of shares with voting rights, are present. 
 
 
                                                          
2 The term used in Brazil is Taxa de Juros de Longo Prazo (TJLP). The TJLP is determined by Conselho 
Monetário Nacional (CMN) and is used as the long term financing cost on the loans granted by the state 
banks for development. 
3 For numeric examples please see Boulton et al. (2012) and Colombo & Terra (2014). 
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2.2 Hypotheses development 
 
Implementing an ACE system is expected to reduce the debt tax bias, which in turn should 
lead to a lower debt-to-equity ratio. That would happen because the firm would be using more 
internal or external equity instead of debt. In fact, Panier et al. (2013) find this expected result 
when analysing Belgium firms after the implementation of the ACE system in that country. 
Meanwhile, the characteristic of the Brazilian ACE system, to only allow for the 
deductibility of the interest on equity paid out to shareholders, may have three important 
implications. First, firms need to cash out to obtain the deductibility, thus making the latter 
dependent on existing internal funds and directly competing with growth opportunities (Fazzari, 
Hubbard & Petersen, 1988). In frictionless capital markets firms would have the necessary 
conditions to access the equity market and adjust their capital structure when needed (Modigliani 
& Miller, 1958). However, in the presence of markets imperfections, this adjustment may be 
slower or even impossible to follow (Almeida & Campello, 2010). 
Second, there is an effect derived from accounting mechanics on the debt-to-equity ratio. 
This is due to the fact that even if the deductibility of interest on equity leads to a reduction on 
the debt tax bias, the cash out needed lowers the retained earnings and, consequently, lowers the 
equity level. Thus, the tax incentives to use equity instead of debt, in the presence of imperfect 
capital markets, may not be sufficient to compensate the reduction on internal equity.  
Third, when internal funds become insufficient, firms may access the debt market to 
obtain the necessary funds to pay out interest on equity to shareholders. If this is the case, firms 
may benefit twice from the allowed deductibility, one from debt and another from interest on 
equity tax shield. Thus, we may observe a multiplying effect of the tax benefit. Additionally, the 
simulations performed by Almeida & Paes (2013) suggest that the IOE in Brazil, despite reducing 
the cost of new equity, is not sufficient to compensate the tax benefit of debt financing. 
Considering the three stated implications from the specificities of the Brazilian ACE-type 
system, we expect the existence of interest on equity to intensify the debt tax bias, instead of 
reducing it. The first research hypothesis is thus the following: 
 
H1: The interest on equity positively affects the preference for debt financing instead of 
equity. 
 
 Firms may become financial constrained in the presence of capital markets imperfections 
(Hubbard, 1998; Almeida, Campello & Weisbach, 2004; Crisóstomo, López-Iturriaga & 
Vallelado González, 2014). Financially constrained firms may have difficulty in accessing the 
debt market, making internal and external funds not fully replaceable (Almeida & Campello, 
2010). Since internal funds are relatively less costly (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Fazzari et al., 1988), 
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this may lead to a preference for cash holdings instead of cash distribution to shareholders (Vogt, 
1994; Hubbard, 1998; Almeida et al., 2004; Arslan, Florackis & Ozkan, 2006). This behaviour is 
expected to be more severe in countries with weak investor protection, bank-oriented financial 
system and low level of development, similar to Brazil's (Khurana, Martin & Pereira, 2009). 
Although the low use of tax benefits has been associated with conservative financial policies 
(Graham, 2000), recent evidence shows that when all tax shields and distress costs are accordingly 
considered, firms produce tax-efficient capital structures (Blouin, Core & Guay, 2010). 
Additionally, simulations show that in Brazil the tax distortion is amplified when the access to 
less costly financing sources increases (Almeida & Paes, 2013), condition favourable to 
financially unconstrained firms. 
 Therefore, the effect of interest on equity may be different in firms subject to different 
levels of financial constraints, with different financing costs and accessibility to external funds. 
The second research hypothesis is thus the following: 
 
H2: The effect of interest on equity on the preference for debt instead of equity is higher 
in financially unconstrained firms. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data  
 
The initial sample included all non-financial firms listed on São Paulo’s Stock Exchange 
(BM&FBovespa) between 2000 and 20094. The financial statements were obtained from the 
Economática® database, while the information regarding ownership structure and American 
Depositary Receipt (ADR) was collected from the annual reports disclosed by the Comissão de 
Valores Mobiliários (CVM)5. The list of quoted firms in three high-governance listings (Novo 
Mercado, Level I and Level II) was gathered from the BM&FBovespa’s6 website. 
In order to reduce potential bias we applied the following restrictions: a) to exclude firms 
that have been involved in some sort of M&A, all firm-year observations with an assets annual 
growth or sales growth higher than 100% were eliminated (Acharya, Almeida & Campello, 2007); 
b) to minimize existing measurement errors on the market-to-book variable, all firm-year 
observations with a value higher than 10 were eliminated; c) all firm-year observations that did 
not fulfil the requirements for the tax deductibility of interest on equity were excluded. This 
                                                          
4 The Brazil, from 1994 to 2000, experienced a major inflation control program, Real Plan in 1994, and 
financial crises in emerging markets in Asia, Russia and a domestic currency crisis. Therefore, these 
confounding factors can distort the purpose of assessing ACE implanting in Brazil, which prevents a 
reliable ex-ante vs. ex-post analysis. 
5 http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/indexing.asp. 
6 http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en-us/markets/equities/companies/corporate-
governance.aspx?Idioma=en-us. 
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includes firm-year observations with negative Equity, and that cumulatively have negative 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes and negative Retained Earnings; d) all continuous variables 
were winsorized at the top and bottom 2.5% level to avoid the effect of potential outliers. 
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
 
Implementing the ACE-type system is the remedy used for the treatment of the debt tax 
bias. The first stage of the empirical strategy addresses the first hypothesis (H1) in which the 
payment of interest on equity is expected to intensify the debt tax bias, and where this effect 
increases with higher payment levels. In order to do so, we look at the causal effect of the 
treatment variable interest on equity on an outcome representing the debt tax bias. In this research 
the outcome variable is proxied by two measures of financial leverage: the Financial debt-to-
assets ratio and the financial debt-to-capital ratio. Although the financial debt-to-capital ratio is 
more suitable, because it only considers the two deductible financing sources (Welch, 2011), we 
keep the Financial debt-to-assets ratio to allow the comparability with previous studies (Klemm, 
2007; Ness Junior & Zani, 2001; Zani, Leites, Macagnan, & Portal, 2014)7, where this variable 
was used for similar purposes. 
The first test involves a model estimation (see Equation 1), using ordinary least squares 
(OLS), where the dependent variable is leverage and the main predictor is interest on equity (IOE). 
As previously stated leverage is proxied by two different measures: the Financial debt-to-assets 
ratio and the financial debt-to-capital ratio. The variable IOE is defined as the ratio between 
interest on equity and total assets. Indicative of a reduction on the debt tax bias, we expect the 
coefficient of IOE to be negative and statistically significant. Following the existing literature on 
capital structure (Booth, Aivazian, & Demirguc-kunt, 2001; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Graham & 
Leary, 2011; Harris & Raviv, 1991) we include additional control variables in our model. The 
level of cash flow is measured by the ratio of cash flow-to-assets (Cash flow). CAPEX is the ratio 
of capital expenditures-to-assets while the level of cash holdings is measured as the ratio of cash 
holdings-to-assets (Cash holdings). We define firm size as the natural logarithm of assets (Size). 
To proxy for investment opportunities we use the market-to-book ratio of assets (Market-to-
book). To control for differences between industries, and following (Frank & Goyal, 2009), we 
include industry dummies according to the NAICS level 1 industrial classification system. Given 
the specific purpose of the present study, we include a control variable for the tax shield (Tax 
shield) in order to control for capital tax shields associated to the deductibility of interest expenses 
and interest on equity, but also to control for the non-capital tax shields, such as depreciation 
expenses and investment tax credit. Following Carvalhal & Leal, 2013 and Costa, Paz & Funchal 
                                                          
7Klemm (2007) used financial debt-to-equity, while Zani et al., (2014) used total debt-to-assets, which is a 
measure with more error for considering other non-deductible sources of financing (e.g., trade credit). 
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(2008), we use a dummy for ADR firms (Financial unconstraint) in order to control for the 
different access levels to the capital markets. All variables definitions are presented in Appendix 
1. 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (Equation 1) 
 
Given the characteristics of the Brazilian ACE-type system presented in Section 2, we 
know that the interest on equity treatment is not random. In fact, firms must comply with a set of 
eligibility criteria, have available internal funds or access to the external funds market, and also 
take into consideration the tax preferences of their shareholders. These may induce a potential 
problem of selection bias/self-selection bias, which violates the unconfoundedness assumption  
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Therefore, estimation through OLS is unappropriated because 
treated and non-treated firms may respond differently to specific observables and unobservable 
confounders, as well as to treatment intensity (t). Given the specific characteristics of the study, 
we apply continuous treatment effects estimated using a dose-response function (DRF) on 
endogenous and exogenous treatment, as proposed by Hirano & Imbens (2004) and implemented 
by Cerulli (2014). The DRF enable us to observe the effect of a continuous treatment – interest 
on equity – while the treatment reacts to observable (exogenous treatment) or to unobservable 
(endogenous treatment) confounders, and also enable us to evaluate the effect not only of the 
payment decision (w) of IOE, but also the effect of the its level of payment (t) on the debt tax 
bias. The implementation by Cerulli (2014) is adequate for the following reasons: it does not 
assume full normality, adjusting well to the case where there are several firm-year observation 
with zero-level of treatment; firms may react differently to observables confounders; and it allows 
for the inclusion of endogenous treatment on unobservables confounders. 
In this context, we performed a second test of the first hypothesis (H1), estimating a DRF 
under exogenous treatment, where the unconfoundness condition (or conditional mean 
independence) of a set of exogenous variables restores the condition of randomness. This allows 
us to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE(t)) directly from the regression obtained through 
DRF-OLS (Cerulli, 2014; Hirano & Imbens, 2004). The outcome equation (Equation 2) is 
specified as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑎𝑇𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑇
2𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑇
3𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                              (Equation 2)                                               
 
Our variable of interest is IOE. The goal is to get the average treatment effect (ATE) on 
a given dosage (t) of IOE on the Leverage The ATE(t) is obtained by the weighted average of each 
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different propensity score estimated for a given dose of treatment (t). The identification of ATE 
e DRF is obtained with three polynomial factors of the DRF,  𝑎𝑇𝑤𝑖,𝑡, 𝑏𝑇
2𝑤𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑐𝑇
3𝑤𝑖,𝑡.We 
include the same control variables used in Equation 1. 
Our variable of interest is IOE, estimated on equations 3 and 4. The goal is to get the 
average treatment effect (ATE) on a given dosage (t) of IOE on the Leverage The ATE(t) is 
obtained by the weighted average of each different propensity score estimated for a given dose of 
treatment (t). We include the same control variables used in Equation 1. 
 The third test for our first hypothesis (H1) includes the estimation of a DRF under the 
endogenous treatment w (and not t), where the selection-into-treatment is dependent on both 
observable and unobservable confounders. In this case, we need to use a type-2 tobit model with 
instrumental variables (IV) estimation in order to restore the consistency of the estimators. The 
estimation process involves the estimation of three models: (1) an outcome model where the 
outcome is defined through a measure of financial leverage, presented in Equation 2; (2) a 
selection model where the selection w is defined as a dummy variable equal to payment (w=1) 
and non-payment (w=0) of interest on equity, presented in Equation 3; (3) a treatment level model, 
presented in Equation 4, with the dosage level t being defined as  a standardized variable taking 
values within the continuous range [0;100], so 0 corresponds to the minimum value, and 1 to the 
maximum level of interest on equity paid. 
 The estimation of the DRF for the endogenous treatment follows two steps. In the first 
step we jointly estimate Equations 3 and 4 using the Heckman two-step bivariate sample-selection 
model8 (Heckman, 1979). Heckman’s model involves two procedures: (1) estimation of a Probit 
model of w on a set of selection and control variables. The variable w is defined as 1 for treated 
firms and as 0 for non-treated firms; (2) OLS estimation of a treatment-level equation of t on a 
vector of selection variables plus the Mill’s ratio (𝜆) obtained through the selection equation 
(Equation 3). In the second step we use the predicted values of w and t, obtained in the first step, 
and also a vector of independent variables, to estimate an outcome equation (Equation 2) using a 
two stages least squares (DRF-2SLS).  
 The selection Equation 3 is specified as follows: 
 
𝑊(𝐼𝑂𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑 +
∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            (Equation 3) 
 
                                                          
8 Previous results using maximum-likelihood estimation were qualitatively similar. 
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Where W(IOE) is defined for two firm groups: (i) non-treated firms with W(IOE)=0, with a 
treatment level of t=0; and (ii) treated firms with W(IOE)=1, with a treatment level of t>0. 
Although Miller & Modigliani (1961) suggest that the cash distribution does not affect 
shareholders’ wealth, there is large evidence of tax preferences by shareholders, where controlling 
shareholders (Brav, Graham, Harvey, & Michaely, 2008; Chetty & Saez, 2005; Korkeamaki, 
Liljeblom, & Pasternack, 2010) and minority institutional investors (Desai & Jin, 2011) may 
influence firms’ decisions in order to accommodate their individual tax preferences. Additionally, 
Morck (2004) suggests that there is a negative relation between intercorporate dividend taxation 
and the formation of pyramidal control structures. 
 Given the previous evidence, the vector of selection variables that determines the liquid 
benefits of a firm being in condition w=1 or w=0 is supported on the different tax systems 
associated with the shareholders’ legal form, on the quality of corporate governance, and on the 
alternative methods of cash distribution to shareholders. To proxy for these factors, we use the 
following variables: a dummy variable for a minority stake by institutional investors (Fund 
dummy); a dummy variable for the controlling firm (Firm dummy); a dummy variable for 
individual control (IND); a dummy variable for the list of quoted firms in three high-governance 
listings (Novo Mercado, Level I and Level II) in BM&Bovespa (Governance quality dummy); 
and a dummy variable for the payment of cash dividends (Dividends dummy). The control 
variables used in Equation 1 are also included.  
 The treatment-level Equation 4 is specified as follows: 
 
𝑇(𝐼𝑂𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽8𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝜆𝑖,𝑡 +
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (Equation 4) 
 
Where T(IOE) is defined as the dosage (t) of interest on equity divided by the total assets of firm 
i in year t. The variable T(IOE) is normalized in order to only vary between 0 (inexistence of 
treatment) and 100 (maximum level of observed treatment). We include the same control 
variables of Equations 1 and 2. Besides the control variables, we also consider three variables that 
contribute to the selection of the treatment level (t): the maximum level of deductible interest on 
equity legally accepted (Deductible IOE), stated in (Brasil, 1995); percentage of shares with 
voting right held by the controlling shareholder (Control rights); and the payout ratio of the firm 
(Payout ratio), used as an alternative mean of cash distribution to shareholders. The operational 
definition of all variables are presented in the Appendix.  
 The test of our second hypothesis (H2) involves reproducing the second and third tests 
from Hypothesis 1, which are the estimation of DRF-OLS and DRF-IV. The goal is to verify if 
the effect of the IOE treatment on the debt tax bias is heterogeneous, dependent on the financial 
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constraint status of the firm. This heterogeneous effect is determined by an idiosyncratic average 
treatment effect [ATE(x)] on observables variables. A common measure used to classify Brazilian 
firms according to their financial constraint status is a firm’s ability to issue ADR (Costa et al., 
2008; Portal, Zan, & Silva, 2012). Therefore, we use a dummy variable (Financial unconstraint 
dummy) to indicate a financially unconstrained firm (with ADR, dummy equal to 1) or financially 
constrained firm (without ADR, dummy equal to 0). We proceed with the estimation of the 
selection equation (Equation 3) and the treatment level equation (Equation 4), and then of the 
outcome equation (Equation 5) with the following specification: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐼𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡-𝑡𝑜-𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑 +
∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 +𝑡 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (Equation 5) 
 
The variable of interest is the interaction between IOE and the Financial unconstraint dummy and 
we expect its coefficient to be positive and statistically significant. The remaining properties of 
Equation 5 are the same of Equation 2. 
 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of all the variables of interest. We can observe 
that capital financing (equity and financial debt) represents, on average, 38% of firms’ total assets, 
and that the financial debt constitutes 50% of the capital financing. The payment of interest on 
equity represents, on average, 0.5% the firms’ total assets, while the maximum deductible value 
is, on average, 4.23% of total assets. Considering cash flow and cash holdings, these represent on 
average 9.15% and 10.27% of total assets, respectively. Firms seem to be very conservative when 
considering the potential tax benefit they could get from the payment of interest on equity. Interest 
on equity only represents 15.26% of the cash distribution to shareholders (IOE + cash dividends). 
Looking at the profile of the firm’s shareholders, institutional investors are present in 13% of the 
firms, while 55% have pyramidal control structures. Ownership by firms and family is present in 
about 33% and 27% of firms, respectively. About 74% of all firm-year observations include the 
payment of dividends, but only about 22% include the payment of IOE. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Financial debt-to-assets 0.3833 0.2335 0 0.8481 
Financial debt-to-capital 1.0093 1.2045 0 5.5866 
IOE 0.0047 0.0109 0 0.0424 
IOE normalized 11.1713 25.6862 0 100 
CAPEX 0.0686 0.0586 -0.0087 0.239 
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Table 1 (continued): Descriptive Statistics.  
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Cash flow 0.0915 0.0745 -0.1093 0.2674 
Cash holdings 0.1027 0.1056 0.0009 0.4078 
ControlVoting rights 67.3331 28.3347 0 100 
Deductible IOE 0.0423 0.0299 0 0.1227 
Dividend 0.0261 0.0355 0 0.1652 
Dividend dummy 0.7441 0.4364 0 1 
Dividend normalized 15.8216 21.5228 0 100 
Financial unconstraint dummy 0.119 0.3239 0 1 
Firm dummy 0.3291 0.47 0 1 
Funds dummy 0.1265 0.3326 0 1 
Governance quality dummy 0.2589 0.4381 0 1 
Individual dummy 0.2673 0.4426 0 1 
IOE dummy 0.2207 0.4148 0 1 
Market-to-book 1.2169 0.5643 0.5223 3.1599 
Payout ratio 0.1939 0.2921 -0.4252 1.1304 
Pyramid control dummy 0.5551 0.497 0 1 
Size 14.3839 1.6683 9.7936 20.2605 
Tax shield 0.0291 0.2131 -1.1048 0.3644 
 
 
Table 2 reports the results obtained from the OLS estimation of Equation 1. The model 
includes industry and year fixed effects, and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The 
results indicate a negative effect of the IOE on both measures of leverage, suggesting that the 
treatment IOE lowers the debt tax bias. Overall, the control variables show statistical significance 
and sign in accordance with the existing literature on capital structure. These results are in line 
with those found by Zani et al. (2014). However, as discussed in Section 2, OLS estimation 
becomes inconsistent when the unconfoundedness assumption is violated. To re-establish the 
condition of unconfounded treatment assignment, and assuming an exogenous treatment, we 
estimate an OLS dose response function (DRF-OLS). 
 
Table 2: The effect of IOE on the Debt Tax Bias using OLS. 
  
Financial 
debt-to-assets 
Financial 
debt-to-capital 
IOE -1.6664*** -2.7000*** 
 (-3.59) (-4.15) 
Cash flow -0.6676*** -1.1078*** 
 (-7.57) (-8.81) 
Cash holdings 0.1363* 0.0626 
 (1.80) (0.60) 
Size 0.0239*** 0.0307*** 
 (3.43) (3.06) 
Market-to-book 0.0104* 0.0168* 
 (1.69) (1.84) 
Tax shield 0.1332*** 0.1896*** 
 (3.05) (3.05) 
Financial unconstraint dummy -0.0071 -0.0282 
 (-0.29) (-0.82) 
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Table 2 (continued): The effect of IOE on the Debt Tax Bias using OLS.  
  
Financial 
debt-to-assets 
Financial 
debt-to-capital 
CAPEX 0.5079*** 0.4841*** 
 (5.01) (3.53) 
Intercept -0.1307 -0.0883 
 (-0.99) (-0.51) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
R2 0.2496 0.2585 
Number of observations 1877 1877 
Clusters in firm 358 358 
Note: *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are 
presented in parentheses. 
  
Table 3 reports the results of the tests obtained through the DRF-OLS estimation for both 
proxies of financial leverage as the outcome variables. The results show that when the condition 
of unconfoundedness on specific observables is reintroduced, there is a positive and statistically 
significant effect of the treatment IOE on the Financial debt-to-capital measure. Conversely, the 
effect of the IOE is not statistically significant when the proxy Financial debt-to-assets is 
considered. As previously stated, as a proxy for the debt tax bias this ratio shows measurement 
deficiencies (Welch, 2011), and is only included in this study for comparison purposes with 
previous literature. Thus, we cannot reject our first hypothesis (H1) that the treatment by IOE 
tends to increase the debt tax bias instead of reducing it. 
The test for our second hypothesis (H2) includes the interaction between the IOE 
treatment and the financial constrained status, proxied by the Financial unconstraint dummy 
variable. The results of this interaction, presented in Table 3 for the DRF-OLS estimation, show 
an inexistent effect of the treatment IOE on the debt tax bias when the financial constraint status 
of the firm is accounted for. The coefficient of the variable Financial debt-to-assets is negative, 
while positive for the Financial debt-to-capital variable. In both instances the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. 
Table 3 also reports the estimation results for the control variables. These results are in 
line with the existing literature not only in the expected sign, but also regarding the statistical 
significance. We can observe that the three polynomial factors from the DRF show statistical 
significance. 
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Table 3: The effect of IOE on the Debt Tax Bias using DRF-OLS. 
  
Financial 
debt-to-assets 
Financial 
debt-to-assets 
Financial 
debt-to-capital 
Financial 
debt-to-capital 
IOE -0.0073 -0.0068 0.0595** 0.0590** 
 (0.43) (-0.40) (2.31) (2.29) 
IOE × Financial unconstraint dummy  -0.0159  0.0150 
  (-0.87)  (0.62) 
Cash flow -0.6715*** -0.6720*** -1.1054*** -1.1049*** 
 (-11.39) (-11.38) (-13.15) (-13.14) 
Cash holdings 0.1371*** 0.1370*** 0.0606 0.0607 
 (3.57) (3.57) (1.16) (1.17) 
Size 0.0239*** 0.0239*** 0.0305*** 0.0306*** 
 (7.98) (7.97) (6.87) (6.87) 
Market-to-book 0.0100* 0.0100* 0.0171** 0.0171** 
 (1.73) (1.72) (2.06) (2.07) 
Tax shield 0.1325*** 0.1325*** 0.1876*** 0.1876*** 
 (5.09) (5.09) (5.42) (5.42) 
Financial unconstraint dummy -0.0075 -0.0159 -0.0285* -0.0331* 
 (-0.69) (-0.87) (-1.90) (-1.89) 
CAPEX 0.5083*** 0.5067*** 0.4926*** 0.4941*** 
 (7.42) (7.38) (5.29) (5.31) 
Tw -0.0043** -0.0043** -0.0122*** -0.0122*** 
 (-2.48) (-2.49) (-4.71) (-4.71) 
T2w 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (2.92) (2.93) (4.66) (4.65) 
T3w -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (-3.31) (-3.33) (-4.80) (-4.79) 
Intercept -0.1314* -0.1308* -0.0958 -0.0964 
 (-1.75) (-1.74) (-0.96) (-0.97) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.2540 0.2542 0.2646 0.2647 
Number of observations 1877 1877 1877 1877 
Clusters in firm 358 358 358 358 
Note: *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are presented in parentheses. 
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the DRF-2SLS method on the effect of IOE on 
the debt tax bias, considering treatment endogeneity. The order of the results presented is as 
follows: estimation for the selection model (Equation 4); treatment level model (Equation 5) and 
outcome model (Equation 2). The selection and treatment level models are the same for all the 
outcome models (Financial debt-to-assets ratio and Financial debt-to-capital ratio).  
The results from the selection model show that the variables Cash flow, Financial 
unconstraint dummy, Funds dummy and Dividend dummy (Size, Firm dummy and Pyramidal 
control dummy) are positively (negatively) related to higher propensity to pay IOE, with the 
corresponding coefficients presenting statistical significance. These results suggest that firms 
with higher cash flows and financially unconstrained tend to have higher payment of interest on 
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equity. The ownership structure shows the expected effect on the propensity to pay IOE. 
Investment funds have more tax benefits with the IOE, and thus positively influence its payment. 
Since pyramidal ownership structures and firms shareholders have less tax benefits, or even 
additional costs with IOE, they tend to negatively influence its payment 
The results from the treatment level model indicate that the level of payment of IOE is 
increasing (decreasing) with higher cash flow, growth opportunities, tax shield, maximum 
deductible amount of IOE and payment ratio (higher cash holdings, size, CAPEX and controller 
shareholder voting rights). These results are in line with what was expected from estimating the 
level of payment of IOE, since the latter should be positively related to the maximum deductible 
amount, to the tax shield and to cash flow. Given that cash holdings and CAPEX concur with the 
cash distribution to shareholders, it is reasonable to accept the negative relation verified with the 
payment level of IOE. The positive coefficient on the decision to pay dividends, on the selection 
model, and on the payout ratio, on the treatment level model, suggest that the two ways of cash 
distribution to shareholders (cash dividends and interest on equity) should be treated more as 
complements than substitutes. The three polynomial factors from the DRF systematically present 
statistical significance. The Lambda, a measure of the level of selectivity effect, obtained from 
the selection and treatment level models, is statistically significant and denotes the existence of 
selection problems on the treatment by IOE, and thus we should consider the treatment of IOE on 
the debt tax bias as being endogenous. The outcome models show a positive effect of IOE on both 
measures of financial leverage. Therefore, from either one of the DRF-OLS or DRF-2SLS 
estimations, we cannot reject Hypothesis 1 (H1) that the continuous treatment by IOE increases 
the debt tax bias instead of decreasing it. The control variables and the three polynomial factors 
on the outcome models of the DRF-2SLS estimation show the same signs and statistically 
significance of those obtained through the DRF-OLS estimation. 
Table 4 also reports the estimation of the effect of the heterogeneous financial constraint 
status over the treatment IOE on the debt tax bias, when the treatment is endogenous. The results 
show that for both the Financial debt-to-assets and Financial debt-to-capital ratios, the estimated 
coefficients were positive but not statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot accept Hypothesis 
2 (H2) that the rebound effect of the IOE on the debt tax bias is more severe on financially 
unconstrained firms. The results reported may be influenced by the costs of adjusting the capital 
structure. If this is indeed the case, firms subject to less adjustment costs should respond more 
quickly and contemporaneously to treatment (Almeida & Campello, 2010; Strebulaev, 2007). 
Empiricaly, we should observe a negative coefficient in the tests performed for the heterogeneous 
effect resulting from firms with different financial constrained status (reported in Tables 3 and 4). 
However, these coefficients are positive, while not statistically significant. Therefore, we may 
discard the hypothesis that the results were driven by the costs of adjustment of the financial 
structure. 
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Table 4: The effect of IOE on the Debt Tax Bias using DRF-2SLS. 
  
Selection 
Model 
Treatment 
Level Model 
Outcome Models 
      
Financial 
debt-to-assets 
Financial 
debt-to-assets 
Financial 
debt-to-capital 
Financial 
debt-to-capital 
IOE   0.5853** 0.6052** 0.8774** 0.9008** 
   (2.05) (2.13) (2.23) (2.31) 
IOE × Financial 
unconstraint dummy    0.0404  0.0478 
    (0.63)  (0.54) 
Cash flow 4.1784*** 221.8396*** -0.6554*** -0.6447*** -0.8609*** -0.8518*** 
 (6.78) (7.96) (-6.60) (-6.40) (-6.31) (-6.13) 
Cash holdings -0.6095 -41.39*** 0.1130** 0.1119** 0.0168 0.0155 
 (-1.58) (-3.20) (2.50) (2.45) (0.27) (0.25) 
Size -0.0778** -1.1336 0.0232*** 0.0232*** 0.0278*** 0.0277*** 
 (-2.53) (-1.02) (6.77) (6.67) (5.89) (5.81) 
Market-to-book -0.0217 5.1558*** 0.0149* 0.0153* 0.0261** 0.0266** 
 (-0.34) (2.61) (1.87) (1..91) (2.37) (2.40) 
Tax shield -0.2711 26.3324* 0.1193*** 0.1190*** 0.1676*** 0.1672*** 
 (-1.08) (1.89) (5.40) (5.33) (5.52) (5.45) 
Financial unconstraint 
dummy 0.2467** -4.5361 -0.0108 -0.0231 -0.0223 -0.0368 
 (1.98) (-1.09) (-0.68) (-0.93) (-1.02) (-1.08) 
CAPEX -0.1337 -56.6696** 0.5685*** 0.5737*** 0.5873*** 0.5935*** 
 (-0.19) (-2.33) (6.29) (6.28) (4.73) (4.73) 
Funds dummy 0.3484***      
 (3.41)      
Pyramidal control 
dummy -0.1601**      
 (-2.11)      
Firm dummy -0.1584*      
 (-1.73)      
Individual dummy -0.0969      
 (-0.97)      
Dividend dummy 0.9639***      
 (7.74)      
Governance quality 
dummy -0.0661      
 (-0.65)      
Deductible IOE  260.5789***     
  (4.84)     
Control rights  -0.1024**     
  (-2.39)     
Payout ratio  9.6960***     
  (3.01)     
Tw   -0.0693** -0.0710** -.0933* -0.0953** 
   (-2.00) (-2.03) (-1.95) (-1.98) 
T2w   0.0015* 0.0016** 0.0018* 0.0019* 
   (1.94) (1.96) (1.66) (1.68) 
T3w   -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (-1.93) (-1.94) (-1.54) (-1.55) 
Intercept -1.1162* 63.0435*** -0.3328*** -0.3345*** -1.1162* -0.3537** 
 (-1.95) (2.73) (2.87) (-2.85) (-1.95) (-2.19) 
Lambda -9.3249*      
 (-1.73)      
Industry and Year 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1850 1850 1850 1850 1850 1850 
Note: *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Robust  
t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are presented in parentheses. 
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 Additionally, the results found may be being driven by accounting mechanics and 
managerial inertia (Welch, 2004), and not necessarily by tax factors. To rule out this hypothesis, 
we perform an additional test using dividend payment as treatment, instead of interest on equity9. 
This robustness test is adequate since the payment of dividends is an alternative way of cash 
distribution to shareholders that follows the same payment mechanisms as interest on equity. If 
the results are in fact being driven by this accounting mechanics associated with managerial 
inertia, than it would be reasonable to expect similar results between both treatments, both in 
direction as in magnitude. The coefficients for the variable of interest – Dividend treatment - from 
the estimation of the robustness tests are reported in Table 5. The estimation was performed using 
OLS, DRF-OLS and DRF-2SLS, for both measures of financial leverage. The results show a 
negative effect, with non-systematic statistical significance, of the treatment dividend payment 
on the financial leverage of firms. Therefore, we can reject the possibility of the rebound effect 
of the treatment IOE on the debt tax bias being driven by accounting mechanisms and managerial 
inertia. Overall, the tax motive is reinforced. 
  
Table 5: Robustness Test: Effect of dividend payment on financial leverage 
  
Outcome Models 
 Financial debt-to-assets   Financial debt-to-capital 
  OLS DRF-OLS DRF-2SLS  OLS DRF-OLS DRF-2SLS 
Dividend -0.0230 -0.0222** -0.0541  -0.0818*** -0.0787*** -0.1080 
 (-1.55) (-2.22) (-1.20)  (-3.84) (-5.39) (-1.60) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1877 1850 1850   1880 1850 1850 
Note: *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are presented in parentheses. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Our results suggest that the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) system implemented in Brazil 
leads to an increase on the debt tax bias. This is contrary to what is expected from this type of tax 
policy. It also goes against the existing literature where Brazil has been referenced as an example 
of an emerging country using the ACE system as a way to mitigate the debt tax bias. The results 
found are not heterogeneous regarding the firm’s ability to access the external capital market. The 
tests are robust to different measures of financial leverage, and to the possibility that they are 
being driven by costs of adjusting the capital structure or accounting mechanisms. 
                                                          
9 In the selection model the variable dividend payer is replaced by IOE payer, while in the treatment level 
model the variable payout ratio is replaced by IOE/assets. 
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The empirical results suggest that the Brazilian ACE system is flawed, mainly because of 
two factors. The first is the fact of being required to distribution cash to shareholders for the tax 
deductibility. In this case, the ACE incentives do not compensate for the reduction in equity due 
to cash distribution. The second is due to the existence of tax benefits heterogeneous among 
shareholders firms, which favors the controlling shareholders which adjust the cash distribution 
according to their tax preferences. The empirical results suggest that firms with participation of 
pension funds and shareholders users of pyramidal structure as control enhancing mechanisms 
are more and less likely to use ACE system, respectively. Therefore, there may be a "ACE 
clientele effect" induced by heterogeneity in tax preferences among shareholders. 
Policy makers have recognized the effect of the interest tax deductibility on the 
asymmetric treatment of debt and equity as one the factors that promote the distortion in 
incentives to leverage (FSB Financial Stability Board, 2015) being intensified in developing 
countries due to high inflation (Abramovsky, Klemm, & Phillips, 2014). Indeed, non-financial 
companies from emerging countries have experienced large increases in their leverage above 
levels considered normal. This increase in leverage has been recognized as an issue that has 
implications on economic growth and financial system stability. In response to this situation, 
policy makers have suggested the adoption of allowance for corporate equity as a way address 
the debt-equity tax bias in emerging markets (FSB Financial Stability Board, 2015). The 
implementation of ACE system in emerging economies is more challenging, but it can bring great 
advances in these economies (Abramovsky et al., 2014). Differences between advanced and 
emerging economies could lead to different trade-offs between the designs of tax systems (Miller, 
2014), so even though Brazil is the only emerging economy with ACE system, it is expected that 
their experience be a lesson for ACE systems  implementations expected in the near future. 
The empirical results about the Brazilian experience suggest that the new ACE system 
designs must address concerns about the effects of eligibility criteria. In Brazil, distribution cash 
requirement causes negative net benefits to the tax treatment of debt bias. The necessity of 
distribution of cash makes the ACE systems to compete with the preference of firms to retain 
internal funds. In addition, the capacity to controlling shareholders in setting the cash distribution 
policy according to their tax preferences can have two effects: make the effectiveness of the ACE 
system dependent on the ownership structure and substantially change the ownership patterns of 
firms by tax-induced clientele effect. Therefore, the underlying mechanism of the Brazilian ACE 
system is flawed and it needs to be redesigned to fulfill its role. In this reformulation Brazil can 
follow the current ACE systems  of Belgium and Italy that have shown positive results in the 
treatment of debt tax bias (Panier et al., 2013; Panteghini, Parisi, & Pighetti, 2012) and do not 
require the distribution of funds as a criterion for obtaining tax deductibility of equity. 
Our empirical results also contribute to the literature on corporate governance, on capital 
structure and cash distribution policies when considering the way firms react to tax incentives in 
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the presence of tax preferences by controlling and influent shareholders, by adjusting their 
decisions on the level of debt, equity and cash distribution to shareholders. 
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Appendix – Variables definitions 
 
Variables Definition 
Financial Debt-to-Assets Ratio of financial debt to total assets. 
Financial Debt-to-Capital Ratio of financial debt to capital. Capital is defined as equity plus 
financial debt. 
IOE Ratio of interest on equity to total assets. 
IOE normalized Ratio of interest on equity to total assets. (IOE) normalized in order to 
only vary between 0 (inexistence of treatment) and 100 (maximum 
level of observed treatment). 
CAPEX Ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. 
Cash flow Ratio of net income plus depreciation to total assets. 
Cash holding Ratio of cash holdings to total assets. 
Control rights Percentage of shares with voting rights owned by the controlling 
shareholder. 
Deductible IOE Ratio of Deductible IOE to total assets. Deductible IOE is the Product 
between the difference of the previous year equity and revaluation 
reserves and the long-term interest rate, limited to the highest of 50% 
of the net income or retained earnings of the previous year. 
Dividend Ratio of cash dividend to total assets. 
Dividend normalized Ratio of cash dividend to total assets. (Dividend) normalized in order 
to only vary between 0 (inexistence of treatment) and 100 (maximum 
level of observed treatment). 
Dividends dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm pays dividends 
and zero otherwise. 
Financial uncontraint dummy Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm is not financial 
constrained and zero otherwise. Firms with ADR are considered not 
financial contrained. 
Firm dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the controlling 
shareholder is a firm and zero otherwise. 
Funds dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if an investment fund owns 
more than 5% of shares with voting rights and zero otherwise. 
Governance quality dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is listed on the 
three high-governance listing of BM&Fbovespa, and zero otherwise. 
Individual dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the controlling 
shareholder is an individual and zero otherwise. 
IOE dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm pays interest on 
equity and zero otherwise. 
Market-to-book Ratio of market value of assets to total assets. The market value of 
assets is defined as total assets minus equity plus the market value of 
equity. 
Payout ratio Ratio of cash dividend to net income. 
Pyramid Control Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the ultimate controlling 
shareholder uses a pyramid structure and zero otherwise. 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Tax shield Ratio of the difference of EBIT and the ratio of income tax payments 
to corporate tax rate to sales. 
 
 
